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by László Csaba 
This contribution attempts to decipher the largely unintended, still predictable conse-
quences of crisis management in the global economy. In a series of improvised, case-by-
case and unilaterally demand-focused measures, governments tried to extend the Keynes-
ian arsenal to a system whose basic features are unlike those of the national economy. 
While the collapse of output and employment, on par with the Great Depression, could 
indeed be averted, conditions for the resumption of sustainable finance and growth have 
been undermined. 
Dieser Beitrag versucht, die meist unbeabsichtigten, aber vorhersehbaren Konsequenzen 
des Krisenmanagements für die globale Ökonomie zu analysieren. Die Regierungen ver-
suchten mit einer Reihe improvisierter und einseitig nachfrageorientierter ad-hoc-
Maßnahmen, das keynesianische Arsenal auf ein System anzuwenden, das sich in wesent-
lichen Merkmalen von den nationalen Volkswirtschaften unterscheidet. Während ein 
Zusammenbruch der Wirtschaftsleistung und der Beschäftigung – zu dem es in der Welt-
wirtschaftskrise nach 1929 kam – verhindert werden konnte, wurde die Wiederaufnahme 
einer nachhaltigen Finanz- und Wachstumspolitik erschwert. 
The years of 2007–2009 entered into economic history as the herald of a new 
era. While the process is still open ended, and the shape of recovery – U, L or 
W – is still in dispute, the modest recovery registered in major economies in the 
second and third quarters of 2009 allows us to conceptualise an end to recession, 
rather than engaging in the endless debates on doomsday scenarios and threats of 
depression. On the base of available statistics we can claim with reasonable cer-
tainty that the degeneration of the financial crisis, triggered by the collapse of the 
US subprime markets and the ensuing extinction of the investment banking in-
dustry, has not escalated into a depression along the lines of 1929–33 as feared 
by many. Contraction of global output is likely to be in the range of 3 %. GDP 
did grow in 2008 in all major economies except Japan, and forecasts – from 
those of the most pessimistic OECD to the more sanguine ones of the IMF – 
invariably predict positive numbers for 2010. By 2011 most analysts expect a 
return to normalcy, i. e. of about 5 % per annum growth of the global economy. 
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The central claim of this paper is to challenge this unconditional optimism, 
which is derived mainly from the nature of the modelling exercise. If for no other 
reason, because of their mechanic composition, econometric models tend to 
presume – what in reality would be in need of theoretical substantiation – that 
once the worst is over, things will get back automatically to normalcy. The latter 
means in most of the cases the status quo ante. 
As a matter of fact it is more than tempting to agree with this intuitive proposi-
tion, often formulated in elaborate technical form. If for no other reason, because 
the pre-crisis 15 years were rightly termed as the period of Great Moderation.1 In 
short, cyclical fluctuations have become smaller, fiscal policies were gradually 
converging to fairly orthodox positions, price stability for all practical purposes 
secured and thus growth sustaining and also trickling down.2 Even in such bot-
tom cases as in Sub-Saharan Africa growth was over 5 % per annum in 1993–
2008 and inflation declined to single digit numbers.3 While policies actually 
conducted by major countries, most notably by the USA, Italy and France often 
strongly deviated from the theoretically advocated, sound positions, the broad 
agreement – which we may term the OECD policy consensus – seem to have 
survived, at least in the normative plain. Nobody close to government – let alone 
in actual government positions – advocated nationalisations, uncontrolled public 
debt, condoning inflation or sustaining high general government deficit. True, 
the Stability and Growth Pact of the EU was softened up in March 2005, but the 
change also included tightening in a number of areas, such as the ways deficit 
was to be accounted and highlighting the role of debt/GDP rates in the overall 
assessment. The latter indicator – having both a memory and predictive power 
over the leeway the government is going to have in the medium run – actually 
pre-empted the accession of most new member states to the single currency, 
contrary to their original intentions.   
I. From Great Moderation to Great Fears 
But times have changed since then, and former frontrunners have turned into 
laggards. Irish debt/GDP ratio tripled in 2007–2010, British debt levels doubled, 
 
1  Stock, J./Watson, M.: Has the Business Cycle Changed, and Why?, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 
17 (2002), 157–237. 
2  Sala i Martin, X.: The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and Convergence Period, in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121/2 (2006), 351–397. 
3  African Development Bank: African Development Report, 2009, Oxford, 2009. 
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and America in 2009 exceeded the Maastricht debt ceiling, something that com-
pares to wartime periods only, with gross debt forecast by the OECD to reach the 
staggering 110 % by 2011, unless quick remedial action is taken. Also the Baltic 
States, known inter alia for their prudent fiscal policy and negligible public 
debt/GDP ratios, have experienced a debt explosion, primarily accumulated by 
private households rather than the state. This was coupled with an unprecedented 
contraction of their output, 15–17 % in a single year in 2009. The European 
Commission warned of the danger of EU public debt growing over 110 % by 
2014 in a no-change scenario, and even President Obama, himself a proponent of 
fiscal stimulus in his election campaign, reckoned with a probability of a “dou-
ble-dip recession”, should the scenario of more of the same – pumping unlimited 
money in the economy – continue.4 And as it happens so often, the theoretical 
approval of policy misdeeds was no slow to emerge.  
True, prior to the interpretation of policy changes a degree – perhaps too small a 
degree – of soul searching in the profession had started. The balance of power, 
previously showing the pre-eminence of new classicals and adherents of rational 
expectations and often even its more radical edition, the up until recently domi-
nant fiscal creed of the efficient market hypothesis started to change in favour of 
more heterodox approaches. Let us note, those have never been extinct from the 
profession at large, although leading top economics journals and the most pres-
tigious theoretical economics departments rarely cultivated this latter type of 
output. 
First, the choir of old and new Keynesians have launched the “I told you so all 
the time” song. In a way, authors who have long been sticking to this position, 
such as Paul Krugman5 or Joseph E. Stiglitz6, whose productivity defies search 
programmes, can vindicate a degree of satisfaction, at least in the sense that their 
warning of the need to care about effective demand made its way back into pol-
icy-making, at the cost of more technical approaches and also at the cost of pre-
viously predominant views on the uses of rigid fiscal frameworks. It is instruc-
tive that one of the last immediate disciple of Keynes, Axel Leijonhufvoud7 called 
attention to the fact that contemporary problems are quite unlike the ones experi-
 
4  Financial Times of 19. 11. 2009. 
5  Krugman, P.: The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008, New York, 2008. 
6  Stiglitz, J. E.: Death Cometh to the Greenback, in: National Interest, November/December 2009. 
7  Leijonhufvud, A.: Out of the Corridor: Keynes and the Crisis, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33/4 
(2009), 741–757. 
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enced in the 1930s. Furthermore the changes in the transmission mechanisms and 
also in the logic of functioning in financial markets were such that simple de-
mand management measures, never advocated in their rude form by Lord Keynes 
himself, can only be counterproductive, already in the medium run. 
Second, long time critics of the mainstream of economic theory were also able to 
take a sweet revenge by pointing to the uses of their broader approaches. Perhaps 
the most influential among them was the book by Akerlof and Shiller8 calling for 
the reintroduction of psychology instead of outdated mechanics in the under-
standing of economic processes, in theory and practice alike. In a somewhat 
striking turn against their previous academic output they too turn towards advo-
cating traditional Keynesian policy remedies for the crisis. Representatives of the 
old institutionalist school9 have underscored the dangers of the reductionist, 
technicist approach that had dominated economic textbooks and financial analy-
ses alike in the decades before the crisis. They point to the need for a broader, 
more sophisticated and institutionally informed approach in understanding the 
economy and offering policy advice.  
So far, so good. But then a long list of new converts came, whom we should not 
necessarily cite by their name. Some of the claims are just journalistic excesses, 
others constitute rehashes of old and rightly forgotten theorems and theorists, 
Marx and Polányi included. What renders us to reflect on such propositions, as a 
third group, is that they are often espoused by top policy-makers and propagated 
at top international policy forums, such as G-20 meetings and EU Councils. 
While we do not consider it to be an academic job to process current policy 
commentary, it is hard to overlook that the discourse in the 2007–2009 period 
has become such that it has by and large undermined the previous OECD policy 
consensus. In other words, there are signs that fallacies are being considered as 
virtues and virtues are downgraded to old fashioned beliefs in doctrines that 
should no longer influence theories or even less so policy-makers. 
If a later historian were to caricature the period of Great Moderation, policy-
relevant economic theory would perhaps be reduced to four commandments. (1) 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the predominance of private prop-
erty is unchallenged. Nationalisation is always a fallacy. (2) Demand manage-
 
8  Akerlof, G./Shiller, R.: Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It 
Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton, NJ, 2008. 
9  Most prominently Hodgson, G. J.: The Great Crash of 2008 and the Reform of Economics, in: Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics, 33/6 (2009), 1205–1221. 
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ment is out, regulating money supply and reducing public debt is in. (3) Regula-
tion, in general, leads to rent seeking and profiteering by ignorant bureaucrats. 
Deregulation allows for the invisible hand to sort out everything that needs to be 
sorted out, and this process allows for the spread of innovation and the trickle 
down of growth. (4) Market protection is generally a bad idea. All the more so, if 
it is rooted by the attempt to save jobs, which are not to be saved anyway. Flexi-
ble labour markets are the answer to structural and cyclical changes alike.   
Whatever one may think about the merits or de-merits of this line of reasoning, it 
would be hard to deny the formative influence of the above sketched way of 
thinking on what we termed the OECD consensus on economic policy. While 
many countries – even in the EU – frequently violated these commandments, in 
normative terms this was seen much like individual Christians trespassing 
against the Ten Commandments in the course of their lives. Bad as it may be, but 
misdeeds hardly change the normative view of how things should be.   
II. Touching the Untouchable? Changes in Property Rights 
This academic certainty, by which academically trained and active economists 
tended to observe the complexity of the contemporary world, is by now gone. In 
all the four areas we see previous forefighters of the creed to act in reverse, and 
even attempting to justify, rather than rectify, their deeds on grounds of new or 
reinvented theories. The Pope may well sin, but never preach the value of being 
sinful. When the US government nationalises banks, protects American corpora-
tions from “hostile” takeover by foreigners, pumps money equalling to an entire 
year’s GDP into the economy, closes down important segments of its market 
starting up with the job market, and allows for the ballooning of public debt 
while fighting calls for governmental restraint on fiscal and monetary stimulus as 
doctrinaire, this is perhaps a good analogy. The more it happens as part of a 
“new economic philosophy” rather than mere fire fighting, the further the anal-
ogy goes. 
Likewise European governments have been rather prolific in indulging in a vari-
ety of state interventionism that was considered unthinkable say a decade ago. 
Perhaps the most frightening in this series of improvisation is the pronounced 
lack of any systemic thinking, even in the homeland of Ordnungstheorie und 
Ordnungspolitik. For it is perhaps the worst thing that may happen to any free 
society, if a government lapses into a series of unplanned and unintended inter-
ventions, which just multiply themselves like viruses and spread without any-
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body intentionally spreading them. This is an old insight of Ludwig von Mises10 
from the study of command methods that proliferated during World War I and 
indeed avowedly served as models for Bolsheviks in conceiving their model. But 
worst of all, the study showed, the outcome may result from the unintended con-
sequences of well-meaning democratic governments – an idea largely validated 
in the post-World War II period of statist economic policies in Britain, France 
and Italy.   
This is not to launch a new crusade for privatisation along the lines of the 1980s, 
first conceived in the Thatcher-Reagan revolution, later followed up by the ex-
perience of post-communist countries. To be sure, there is no panacea for any 
economic matter, including efficient corporate governance under various institu-
tional and policy settings, for all countries and all times, as the universalism of 
economic theory in its mainstream form would suggest and positively require. 
Still, references to the collapse of some private firms, as AIG, or the disputed 
outcomes of some privatisations, as those of the British Rail, by themselves do 
not suffice to question the relevance of broader and empirically tested insights on 
the generally more efficient workings of private firms, as indicated by many 
previous empirical studies. More recent studies of privatisation experience11 have 
also been supportive of earlier findings about the structurally superior perform-
ance of private corporations in most sectors and countries, provided the regula-
tory environment is appropriate, i. e. does not allow for monopolies and rent 
seeking. By contrast good performance of public firms can be observed in cases 
if they also work under competitive pressures of a contestable market and their 
budget constraint remains – or in most cases becomes – hard. 
This overwhelming experience, grounded also in economic theory, does not let 
itself be swept away easily by references of individual less efficient and even 
positively unsuccessful privatisations. It might well be that nationalising a bank 
like Northern Rock or Llyods Insurance was the cheapest way to pre-empt the 
already unfolding systemic crisis and also, in theory, to save taxpayers’ money – 
whether this is true, especially in consolidated terms and audited by external 
bodies, will perhaps be known in decades rather than months, with reference to a 
combination of business and state secrets. But one may well wonder, if these 
exceptional arrangements translate into a new policy line. 
 
10  Mises, L. v.: A Critique of Interventionism (1929), Aubum, AL, 1977. 
11  Estrin, S. et al.: The Effects of Privatization of Ownership in Transition Economies, in: Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47/3 (2009), 699–728. 
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At the time of writing, nobody can as yet have a clear answer to the fundamental 
question if, and to what degree, a paradigmatic change in terms of policy think-
ing is in the making. The British government goes out of its ways to explain the 
temporary nature of nationalisations. Likewise in the US similar propositions are 
being aired from the Obama administration. By contrast in Continental Europe 
statist traditions seem to have been experiencing a revival, at least on the discur-
sive level. It would not make sense to follow the example of those who, on the 
base of newspaper articles, interviews and half-baked policy drafts try to identify 
the building blocs of new policy strategies. However it seems clear that the pol-
icy reaction, in the case of nationalisations, was largely spontaneous and has not 
followed any broader consideration. By the same token no ex ante policy of how 
to get out of business of crisis management has emerged. Furthermore even the 
broad contours of timing of measures putting an end to the series of improvisa-
tions remain unknown. The latter included pumping unlimited amounts of money 
in the economy and extending public ownership to spheres previously unknown. 
For this reason it is reassuring to read ever more frequent references, also by top 
policy makers, to the need to find what they euphemistically term an exit strat-
egy from the mess, created in part by the crisis, in part by its (mis-)management.   
What is truly intriguing from our perspective is not whether those projects will 
be forthcoming, as this is a matter of time rather than a matter of if. What is 
likely to be problematic is the semi-permeability of economic decisions: easy to 
do one way, next to impossibly the reverse way. For instance it is relatively easy 
to re-inflate an economy, while it is difficult to cool down inflationary expecta-
tions, even if agents are forward looking and well informed. None of the two 
traditional assumptions may hold in a post-crisis situation. For one, most of the 
“agents” are households, usually suffering from jobless growth, a period of 18–
24 months following recovery of overall economic activity. In this period, when 
output already does grow, but employment does not, it is rational and justified to 
hold out and not to spend along the growth of household income – whether there 
is such growth is an empirical issue to be studied case by case. Second, not least 
as a consequence of the former, the perception of a lasting stagnation may sur-
vive way into the recovery period, not allowing for the type of adjustment the 
rational expectations model would forecast. For all those reasons neither spend-
ing, nor disinflation may follow the patterns expected in the model.12 
 
12  It is a different, though in part related story, if and to what degree those models, especially of efficient 
markets ever held and if these contributed to upswings or to intransparency and the “irrational exuber-
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Likewise, nationalising a bank requires a stroke of a pen only. It can be done and 
has been done overnight, which is one of the big lures of this option. However, 
reversing the act is anything but straightforward. First, if recovery is slow and 
expectations remain pessimistic, buyers in all, but the most extreme cases, also 
tend to be restrained. Even if the government is truly intent on and committed to 
re-privatisation, buyers might not be forthcoming – an experience post-commu-
nist countries had much of in the 1990s. If buyers are forthcoming, heavy policy 
choices are yet to be made, which are unlikely to remain uncontested even under 
the best of circumstances – meaning a pro-privatisation public mood, which is 
anything but given at the time of writing. First, if and to what degree financial 
investors may have the upper hand. This seems trivial, but many governments, 
also in the West, consider banks as a type of family silver, especially if they 
serve broad segments of the population like house owners. And second, in the 
case of strategic investors, the question if the buyer is involved in a hostile take-
over, or in a mere restructuring, often of radical brand, implying major layoffs 
and slimming cure for local financial institutions, the politics of the decision 
is/will be hard to eschew.  
What has been said implies that broad state involvement in the ownership and 
actual running of banks is a phenomenon which is unlikely to go away as quickly 
and painlessly as contraction of output goes away in any business cycle theory. 
Involvement of the state hand, according to theory and experience alike, does 
involve the presence of criteria other than those of improved allocative efficiency 
in the decisions on lending, restructuring, employment and many other funda-
mental issues of macroeconomic significance. The lack of catching up of Europe 
to the USA as envisaged by the Lisbon Agenda of the EU for the current decade, 
is a clear indication, that the European models of social market economy are less 
likely to produce quick efficiency gains and sustainably high growth rates than 
the models where decision over resource allocation are less constrained by public 
policy considerations. This in turns implies that demand management and the 
ensuing record levels of public debts are not innocent sidelines to a generally 
robust and healthy recovery, which is sure to come. 
 
ance” in the words of Greenspan as of 1996, of capital markets in the US and elsewhere, an issue theo-
rised in some detail in Csaba, L.: Crisis in Economics?, Budapest, 2009, Chapter 2.  
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III. How to Manage Demand? 
We have seen above that demand management is back in vogue. This is unsur-
prising, since neo-Keynesianism has been part and parcel of academic good 
manners, and DSGE models, widely used by central banks, allow for this type of 
reaction to the crisis. Moreover Keynesianism has always interpreted itself as 
economics of the crisis. Last but not at all least, similarly to the 1930s, much of 
the spontaneous reactions of policy-makers follow, intuitively or otherwise, the 
Keynesian recipe, perhaps in its simpler versions.  
Let us add, that Keynesianism, although by and large discarded in academia – at 
least in the mainstream departments – has never lost its appeal entirely for policy 
makers. For instance the Stability and Growth Pact of the EU, calling for sur-
pluses in good times but deficit spending at bad times, does follow the original 
Keynesian maxim. True, governments in most of the EU tended to apply those 
insights in an asymmetric fashion, i. e. spending at bad times without making 
savings at good times. The very fact that governments, primarily but not exclu-
sively in the EU, but also in the G-20 have been acting in a coordinated fashion, 
and so did central banks when cutting their interest rates and making other meas-
ures of monetary easing, contributed to avoiding the worst: escalating trade wars 
along the lines of the 1930s triggering a depression. 
In evaluating the latter the established insight should be invoked, namely that 
fiscal stimulus may have a short term impact on the trend rate of output at best, 
as any growth theory, neoclassical or endogenous, would testify. Moreover quan-
titative estimates13 also indicate that short term multipliers may, already in the 
medium run, be overshadowed by negative multiplier effects. Likewise monetary 
easing is unlikely to produce long term effects, if growth is contingent, at the end 
of the day, on factors like innovation, efficiency of allocation and the quality of 
business climate.  
The above measures perhaps deserve some credit in warding off the worst, such 
as competitive devaluations, proliferating market protectionism, and generally 
the beggar thy neighbour policies of the 1930s. These measures – together with 
the nature of globalised finance14 – also contributed to the much smaller than 
feared contraction of the global economy – in the range of 3 % in 2009 – and a 
 
13  Freedman, C. et al.: Fiscal Stimulus to the Rescue? Short Term Benefits and Potential Long Term Costs 
of Fiscal Deficits, Washington, DC, IMF Working Paper, 09/255, November 2009. 
14  Mishkin, F.: Globalization and Financial Development, in: Journal of Development Economics, 89/2 
(2009), 164–169. 
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recovery already in 2010 and 2011 according to each major forecasting agency. 
We shall address, at the end of this paper, if this hyper-optimism is warranted, 
and if yes, under what conditions. 
While acknowledging the virtues of firefighting, an academic can never be con-
tent without looking into the longer term repercussions of the same measures. If 
for no other reasons, because analyses of the Great Depression, including the 
book of Ben Bernanke15 published not long before his nomination to the chair-
manship of the FED, have called our attention to the ephemeral nature of mone-
tary and fiscal interventions. Moreover he also highlighted the dangers inherent 
in policy courting – central bank following market sentiment rather than follow-
ing its own declared objective of sustaining price stability and thus economic 
calculability in the medium to long run. Joining the broad theoretical and histori-
cal overview offered by Issing et al.16 he also highlighted the limitations to what 
monetary policy can attain in fostering the trend rate of output. While the ECB 
has managed, by and large, to act on these theoretical insights, the FED, the 
Bank of Japan and the Bank of England have not followed suit. By entering into 
a wave of unweighted, uncontrolled and unmeasured rate cuts, they have done 
exactly what textbooks – and also the two monographs we cite – have always 
warned them not to. If a central bank follows market sentiment, it becomes just 
one of the many players, losing its privileged position as a trend-setter. Second, it 
loses the sovereign instruments of monetary policy: a close to zero prime rate no 
longer carries any information over governmental policies. It does not stimulate 
savings in monetary form, thus it induces speculation – e. g. in precious metals, 
commodities or just any foreign asset, thus it is no longer able to stimulate the 
domestic economy. This lesson was well documented by the lost decade of Ja-
pan.17 Third, if verbal interventions and forecasts remain ineffectual, which is 
often the case, even the remnants of central bank credibility will be gone. 
Should one think about the burgeoning literature on central bank independence 
and credibility18 the above listed unintended side-effects look truly weighty. If 
for no other reason, because of the difficulty of reversing a process in which 
deep seated convictions and perceptions, most notably trust, credibility and the 
 
15  Bernanke, B.: Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton, NJ, 2005. 
16  Issing, O./Angeloni, I./Gaspar, V.: Decision Making in the European Central Bank, 2nd ed., Cam-
bridge/New York, 2004. 
17  Saxonhouse, G./Stern, R.: The Bubble and the Lost Decade, in: World Economy, 26/3 (2003), 267–281. 
18  De Haan, J./Masciandaro, D./Quityn, M. (eds.): Does Central Bank Independence Still Matter?, Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy, Special Issue, 24/7 (2008). 
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ability to trend-set, i. e. the fundamental features of modern central banking are at 
stake. Whatever were the reasons behind the decisions, we may know for sure 
that the probably much too intimate relationship between markets and central 
banks19, that used to characterise the period of Great Moderation, are unlikely to 
return soon. The more central banks get involved in supervising the banking 
industry, as most recent proposals in the USA would have it, the higher is the 
probability of their permanent loss of status as honest brokers and representatives 
of public interest only. In turn, the efficacy of their intervention is likely to be 
judged under a plethora of angles and considerations, including political, re-
gional, employment, and who knows what other factors. Against those the return 
to a central bank, which is fully independent of daily politics – as the statutes of 
the European Central Bank stipulate – and which has a single target in its objec-
tive function, i. e. headline inflation (HICP in EU parlance), will be next to im-
possible to master.  
It is not very difficult to see that giving up depoliticisation of monetary policy is 
not an intended consequence of crisis management. Still, the more we have to 
reckon with the lasting presence of big quantities of money pumped into the 
OECD economies to avert the collapse of output, the more we see only luke-
warm efforts at fighting the consequences of crisis management, the higher is the 
probability of a relapse into a lasting re-politicisation of monetary policies. 
Under this angle calls for monetary policy to be subordinated to employment 
goals, regional policies, fostering government projects, and the entire long-
forgotten old-fashioned statism will be extremely difficult to avert. The more we 
have conservative governments like that of President Sarkozy and Prime Minister 
Berlusconi, with activist and interventionist economic agendas high on their 
overall policy profile, the graver the danger to be spread across the entire politi-
cal spectrum is likely to be. Against this background the debate about the timing 
and scope of the exit strategy, conducted in public between the IMF and ECB20 
whether or not the time has already come to act, is obviously of subordinate 
relevance at best. For if monetary policy gets re-politicised, there is no way back 
from the joint and combined effects of fiscal and monetary easing and the ensu-
ing stagflationary periods. 
 
19  Greenspan was known to have understood his task to preempt any potential bubble that may hurt Wall 
Street, which was a peculiar – biased – interpretation of the role of public policy as a warden of common 
good. 
20  Világgazdaság of 25. 11. 2009. 
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IV. Revival of Blind Faith in Capacities of the State? 
One of the further unexpected consequences of haphazard and mostly improvised 
crisis management in OECD countries has been the gradual and mostly subcon-
scious return of beliefs most of us thought to have been long forgotten in the past 
three decades. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the related beliefs in central 
planning seem to have sealed in the dustbin of history the beliefs in an omnipres-
ent and omnipotent state administration. True, it would be hard to deny that the 
other extreme of non-interventionism also emerged in the present decade, even 
when legal arrangements of the US would have positively called for it. This 
strange couple could be observed in some of the markets, while fostering non-
prudent behaviour on other markets, most notably in the subprime mortgage 
market.21 Once that done – as the source proves in detail – further regulations to 
avoid brinkmanship would have been required in the related markets as well as 
in the techniques of risk assessment. In reality, exactly the opposite policy was 
adopted, as a conscious choice.  
Let us note at the very outset: the widespread talk about unfettered capitalism 
and unregulated markets seriously misses the point, namely that (a) without 
particular forms of state intervention positively discouraging prudent behaviour 
of financial institutions and (b) without equally straightforward and professed 
policies of non-intervention, allowing for the accumulation of fat profit in the 
shadow zone of activity, not limiting cases of collusion, the subprime crisis could 
never have erupted.22 For in this combination of semi-regulations risks were 
socialised while profits privatised, and the dangers of the game covered by free 
market talk and references to actual and perceived financial innovations, spread-
ing the risks across the globe. The jury is still out over who and when should 
have intervened to stop the bubble from bursting. On the other hand it is equally 
well represented in the literature that two decades of the Greenspan period im-
plied and actually delivered a shield from any bubble to burst. As a result fear 
and caution have been extinct from market players – ironically as an outcome of 
FED policies aimed at avoiding the burst of the bubbles. It is also true that some 
segments of the capital markets, most notably OTC deals and hedge funds tended 
to be under-regulated. But the latter constitute only a minor part of the problem, 
 
21  Győrffy, D.: The Enduring Lure of Socialism: the Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis, in: ZSE, 
7/2 (2009), 250–275. 
22  Swan, P. L.: The Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis: Why Subprime was so Attractive to the 
Creditors?, in: European Journal of Political Economy, 25/1 (2009), 124–132. 
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against the spread of dubious deals and patterns of behaviour in the tightly regu-
lated sector. As shown in the source material cited, profit maximising agents 
ruthlessly exploited loopholes and mistakes in regulation, as well as could count 
on the grandfatherish behaviour of regulators whenever it came to matters of 
collusion (cf. below).   
This fragmentary summary of the literature, that can be extended at will, may 
indicate that the financial crisis should, at least in part, be ascribed to state fail-
ure, in terms of the unintended consequences of policies, which positively fos-
tered – as of low interest rates and privileged housing loans23 – as well as of 
policies, that might have been enacted but were not.  If one recalls the Oxley-
Sarabanes Act, passed in reaction to the Enron crisis in 2001, as well as the wide 
range of potential intervention tools in the hands of authorities overseeing capital 
markets, one may not neglect the responsibility of those who have not acted, 
although the room for action was indeed given. Not allowing for the collusion, in 
which rating agencies were involved, when they evaluated corporations, while 
their returns/fees were related to the value of the firm they evaluated, has always 
been part and parcel of the legal understanding in America. It is a different story 
why so elementary requirements were not applied in actual practice.24 The an-
swer can perhaps in part be related to the overall hands off ideology of the Bush 
administration coupled with the reign of the efficient markets hypothesis in the 
academic financial literature at the cost of other, more realistic and more sophis-
ticated views such as behavioural finance.  
Under this angle the issue of regulation might be seen under a different angle. 
For one, everybody seems to agree on the need of regulation. On the other hand, 
if our above observation holds, at least in part, it might be legitimate to ask, how 
the same organs of the state, whose actions – by omission and commission – 
have been at the root of the crisis itself, can and should be entrusted with more 
regulatory tasks. 
The collapse of communism in the East and the collapse of Bretton Woods in the 
West have contributed to the justified doubts in the abilities of the state to control 
macro- and microeconomic processes in the detail. If we abstract away from 
 
23  Compassionate conservatism implied a declared intention to multiply the number of home owners, 
especially from among the worse-off. 
24  The revised version of the Walker report in the UK introduces a series of measures in terms of collusion, 
risk management, executive pay and individual responsibility in line with the normative view unfolded 
in the main text, but falls short of governmental regulation of the petty detail as feared by many (cf. A 
guide to the Walker report, in: Wall Street Journal, online edition of 26. 11. 2009). 
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cases of criminal negligence, currently investigated in dozens of cases in the US 
and Europe alike, one may arrive at the question of limits to state capacity. The 
more one reflects on the nature of modern finance based to a large degree on 
derivatives and other forms of immaterial transactions and putting numbers of 
future/expected values, the less one is inclined to see how a bureaucrat can, even 
in theory, have the capacity and oversight to regulate such multispeed and multi-
layer processes. As the latter take part basically in the internet, rather than any 
locality, furthermore that markets tend to operate round the clock, 24 hours and 7 
days, it seems impractical to believe that anybody could stop and channel them. 
The ghost is already out of the bottle.  
And here we may well enter into yet another unintended consequence of crisis 
management. The more the state amasses competences and regulatory preroga-
tives, and the more it wishes to impose upon non-cooperating agents of various 
sorts, the lower is the efficiency of those interventions that might work only if 
the intervener were in reality a “perfectly informed agent” of equilibrium eco-
nomics. As a result, the higher flying are the expectations, voiced by politicians, 
the media and the public, in terms of “putting the house finally in order”, the 
lower the efficiency and the more incalculable the outcomes of such interven-
tions are likely to be. One needs a very strong imagination to conceptualise a 
case where governments can launch, run and modernise entire industries, from 
car production to insurance, let alone innovation or financial intermediation in 
the complexity we have come to know in the last quarter of the century. The 
more governments follow their ambition to “put things in order”, the less rele-
vant and less credible their exit strategy may prove to be. In turn, the trust of 
financial markets and thereby the ability to fund these and other – perhaps com-
peting – projects of the private sector will remain limited. In turn, the relocation 
of economic dynamism to emerging markets, and definitely away from ever 
more sclerotic and overregulated Europe, will become a fact of life, as experi-
enced already in the 1970s and 1980s. 
What we observe now is a double danger in terms of regulation. First, regulation 
will be more top-down and thus less efficient, than it would be optimal for re-
covery to sustain, it is likely to proliferate in forms and areas where justification 
on usual public intervention grounds – i. e. creating externalities – is less than 
certain. Second, those regulations, which are meant to be temporary, will become 
lasting constituents of the new system. Enhancing capital requirements across the 
board may well improve solidity, but will decrease the ability to lend, thus re-
covery is bound to slow, and the new bubble might already be in the blowing, as 
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several observers of financial markets have already suggested. Applying Basel 
Two requirements may decentralise risk management, but may also be procycli-
cal, thus once again contributing to stagnation. Protecting jobs (of insiders) is 
known to limit new entry, i. e. the creation of jobs for outsiders, for example by 
micro and small businesses yet to be created. European rates of unemployment 
have been notoriously high in the 1980s and 1990s for precisely those reasons. 
Limiting financial innovation, for fear of the misuses widely reported, may well 
translate into less intermediation, especially to the less competitive segments of 
the global economy, which translates directly into less embodied technological 
progress and lower rates of economic activity. Let us recall that the idea of 
spreading risks is not only about creating new markets to greedy investment 
bankers. The other side of the same coin is the provision of access to funding to 
clients of various sorts, who would otherwise not qualify for access to capital 
markets, or would not even be bankable. The more we accept the relevance of 
finance in the broad context of development,25 the more we may be concerned 
about recent initiatives to constrain financial innovation in general and the use of 
instruments spreading risks geographically and across sectors in particular.  
Should the above described turn in policy practices receive theoretical backing, a 
relapse into the statism of the 1950s and 1960s is a likely outcome. This would 
assign tasks to the governments which they are incapable of mastering, from 
bolstering innovation to creating productive jobs. As a yet another unintended, 
but foreseeable, consequence, the limited administrative capacity, needed to meet 
tasks inherent to public policies, as for example environmental protection, ensur-
ing rule of law and sustainable public finance, will be endangered by the prolif-
eration of conflicting tasks whose numbers and nature is likely to be beyond 
reasonable policy and efficiency control. By the same token the quality of gov-
ernance in key areas is likely to deteriorate, not least due to the impossibility of 
meeting an unlimited amount of tasks, often following different and even con-
flicting priorities and rationalities, such as of short term political versus long 
term economic nature.   
V. Towards Patriotic Economic Policies? 
One of the truly perplexing outcome of the policy drift described above has been 
the return of the theory and practice of market protectionism in most advanced 
 
25  Chin, M. D./Ito, H.: What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions and Interac-
tions, in: Journal of Development Economics, 81/1 (2006), 163–192. 
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economies, the EU itself included. It is perhaps unnecessary to list the measures 
that were making headlines. President Sarkozy’s call to relocate car production 
from new member states to France, the German government’s battle with both 
the US and the EU Commission to save Opel, the intensification of “buy na-
tional” campaigns as well as the spread of measures related to consumer fears all 
point in the direction of reacting to the crisis in the old manners. Recurring at-
tempts to re-impose customs duties and other restrictions of Chinese and Viet-
namese textile and clothing are just among the better known examples. 
This is not to claim that in the pre-crisis period the functioning of the Single 
European Market had been impeccable. The Commission website has long been 
publicising a scoreboard, by the country and the sector, singling out malpractices 
of individual member states in a number of areas. However, as the examples 
listed above may illustrate, market protection, both against competitors from 
within the EU and also from WTO members, has been gaining currency and 
political respectability. The foot-dragging on the further reform of common agri-
cultural policy in the post-2014 period, under the new financial guideline is also 
a case to the point. Pronouncements of some major policy-makers as well as of 
academic authorities call into question the wisdom of export-oriented strategies, 
a line that has moulded the evolution of all successful emerging economies over 
the past 35 years.   
It would be excessive to depict the picture of overall protectionism rising on the 
horizons of the contemporary world economy. The very fact that 2010 and 2011 
are seen as years of recovery, renders such a pessimistic scenario unlikely. How-
ever, owing to the uncertainties that follow from the fragile nature of economic 
revival, burdened with the costs of state activism described in the preceding 
pages, the slow growth scenario is not out of question especially for Europe. The 
financial crisis has also shown the fragility and imperfections in the financial 
sector of the new EU member states. In turn, most recent forecasts no longer 
count on a “return to normalcy”, i. e. of a 4–5 % per annum GDP growth in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe once the crisis is over. Fragility of finances, low levels of 
savings, burgeoning public debt and the crowding out effects of growing debt 
service burden altogether make a slower rate more likely to emerge.  
Under this angle the small open economies in the EU might be particularly heav-
ily hit if the contours of new protectionism, dubbed sometimes as “patriotic eco-
nomic policies” gain currency across the EU. It goes without saying that a long-
ish period of fiscal consolidation, which is likely to set the tone for the medium 
run all across Europe, is not the time when reviving the domestic markets could 
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compensate for the sluggish growth of external demand. For this reason it is the 
common European interest to sustain the accomplishments of European integra-
tion, including stable currency, the single market and the common fiscal frame-
work that would induce governments to undertake those consolidation measures, 
which are needed for sustainable growth to return anyway. Expanding the Euro-
zone, even under temporarily softening of the criteria, may be the cheapest way 
to stabilise economies like those of the Baltics and Bulgaria, which have shown 
fiscal restraint and convergence in the pre-crisis period. The less principal mem-
bers, such as France, Germany and Italy, actually meet the numerical criteria for 
EMU, and far not only and after the financial crisis, the less is the justification of 
rejecting such an unconventional option for the new and fragile members, which 
account for a fragment of financial turnover in the EU and are therefore in no 
position to endanger monetary stability there. The alternative of big, govern-
ment-led bailout packages, extended to Latvia, Hungary, Romania and Serbia, 
does not seem to count among the big success stories, whose presence per se 
would render unconventional suggestions unrealistic.26   
Last but not at all least one should react to the fact that most market protective 
measures are being triggered by concerns about jobs. On this account two obser-
vations may be due. First, as shown in the 1970s and 1980s, structural imbal-
ances in general, and on the labour market in particular, simply do not lend 
themselves to cyclical remedies of demand management. The bigger is the fiscal 
stimulus, the higher the ensuing inflation in the medium and long run.  
Second, the crisis has shown that the major improvement of European employ-
ment record in the 2000–2007 period, leading to a halving of the rate of unem-
ployment in such chronic problem cases as Spain, Poland and Slovakia27 has 
been built on precarious footings if cyclical slump could undo those gains in a 
single year. This calls attention to the need of more implementation of the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy as well as to the need to invest more into human 
capital, especially in vocational training and the development of social skills, 
allowing also less qualified and elder persons to engage in lifelong learning.   
If there is anything new in seeing the revival of employment-related pressures for 
protectionism it is in line with the more recent insights of economic theory on 
 
26  The very fact that EU members had to resort to IMF standby arrangements, and also that EU Commis-
sion was involved in close cooperation with the Washington twins, was itself already a deeply uncon-
ventional policy initiative. 
27  ECB: Statistics Pocket Book, Frankfurt/M., 2009, 44. 
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trade openness. These works28 call attention to the relevance of institutional 
quality in making open markets productive and efficiency enhancing, rather than 
reverting the conventional wisdom and putting the cart in front of the donkey, as 
relapse into protectionism and import substitution would do. 
VI. Towards a New Theory or a New Policy Mix? 
What has been proposed until now is a set of observations where we tried to 
square established economic theories with a set of nonconventional measures of 
crisis management actually implemented by leading economies of the globe in 
response to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We have not found instances that 
would indeed have indeed justified the frequent public calls for a change in eco-
nomic paradigm, as was the case in the aftermath of the Great Depression, or 
following the first and second oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979. In the first case 
the rise of state led models and later in the 1950s the spread of Keynesianism, in 
the second case the emergence of more open economy models and the spread of 
neoliberal approaches of various brands could be observed.  
By contrast, the events of 2007–2009 could relatively well fit to existing theories 
of regulatory capture and state failure, especially if advances on asymmetric 
information are also incorporated in the theoretical frame. The set of policy 
measures, improvised rather than conceived by the major governments, does not 
add up into a new and sustainable policy package. At the time of writing major 
policy making bodies, such as the FED and the ECB, discuss merely the optimal 
timing of the exit strategy from unconstrained fiscal stimulus, not whether such 
an exit is necessary at all.   
One of the additional unintended consequences of crisis management has been 
the insight that contingency planning is back on the main stage. For if the attrac-
tive theories proclaiming – once again – the end of the business cycle, or the 
ability of efficient markets to self-regulate, can no longer be taken seriously, then 
the ability to prepare, in theory, psychology and policy arsenal, for yet another 
slump, should be considered as an exigency for any solid government. 
Second, it has been found, once again, that academic acclaim, not least because 
of the very different success of indicators of the academia from those of policy 
making, may not provide the best and most useful sort of advice decision-makers 
 
28  E. g. Pitlik, H.: The Impact of Growth Performance and Regime Type on Economic Policy Liberaliza-
tion, in: Kyklos, 61/2 (2008), 258–278. 
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may need at times of difficulty. Policy relevance of competing research para-
digms should perhaps be considered, in terms of funding and other forms of 
public appreciation. 
Third, the economics discipline itself has been confronted, once again, with the 
drift between its own standards and performance criteria on the one hand, and its 
ability to interpret and sometimes even influence/change for the better spontane-
ously unfolding real world macro-economic processes on the other. While the 
compulsion to test theories on the ground is a platitude for any physicist, chem-
ist, biologist, medical doctor or psychiatrist, and so is the need to feed back ex-
perimental findings into the theory, such kind of organic interchange had been 
interrupted and often positively denied in mainstream economics. It might be 
time to heed the insights of those who have long reminded the profession of the 
dangers inherent in the Samuelsonian shift in academic methodology and theory-
building,29 which lay at the root of drift between economics and the sciences 
built on experimentation, testing and historic continuity.    
Fourth, while top journals of the economics profession in their vast majority 
proudly reject to get engaged in reflections interpreting the financial crisis and its 
potential implications for theory building, it is unlikely that the marked changes 
on the demand side should, in the medium and long run, have no effect on the 
supply side. Once public institutions, corporations, banks and the media posi-
tively require qualifications able to decipher and improve misdevelopment in 
finances and in economic life (at macro- and household levels alike), the supply 
of economists and by implication of economics departments is likely to adjust its 
output to those manifest changes. It is likely to accelerate the pluralisation of the 
discipline which has been revived already during the aftermath of the previous 
financial crisis of 1997–99 and allow for more institutionally informed ap-
proaches, such as the Austrian school, to regain their traditional academic re-
spectability.  
Fifth, crises have always the benefit of shaking overconfident assumptions, such 
as the idea that economics, based on general equilibrium theory, has already 
answered all major questions, and only limited and technical improvements were 
in place.30 This point was made, in a perhaps even more assertive tone, by Nobel 
winner Robert E. Lucas in a relatively recent programmatic article claiming the 
 
29  McCloskey, D.: The Secret Sins of Economics, Chicago, 2002. 
30  Blanchard, O.: What Do We Know about Macroeconomics what Fisher or Wicksell Did not Know?, in: 
De Economist (Amsterdam), 148/5 (2000), 571–601. 
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following: “My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original 
sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression-prevention has been 
solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many dec-
ades.”31 While this boasting may well sound as naive as the oft cited similar 
claims made by Lord Kelvin on the eve of the Heisenberg-Einstein revolution in 
quantum physics, this was equally meant and taken quite seriously by most of 
the academic profession until the past few years. Adherents of the rational expec-
tations school tended to substitute empirical testing by re-iterating their own 
assumptions and claims. 
Likewise, observing the crisis may prompt us to give up the currently dominant 
view that economic policy can and should be understood and modelled by the 
theory of rational expectations.32 Moreover, the recurrence of crises with the 
notorious – and probably inevitable – inability of both theorists and forecasters to 
provide policy-makers and the public even with an intelligent guesstimate about 
the timing and size of those, may question the prime importance of predictive 
power being the major success indicator of academic soundness. By giving up 
this major cornerstone of the positive economics paradigm economists may be-
come more open to a variety of heterodox approaches. In turn our ambitions as 
well as self-congratulatory tone of analyses might well be lowered, and softer, 
more probabilistic approaches, currently reigning in most of the other sister dis-
ciplines, espoused again, as it used to be the case in economics as well until the 
late 1980s.   
We do not claim to know the future, and our tentative theoretical and policy 
conclusions offered in this essay may well trigger controversy. What we ob-
served fits well into the apt – and often used – dictum of Friedrich August von 
Hayek on the nature of market order: outcome of human action, but not of human 
deliberation. For this reason we should by no means be surprised to observe this 
in the most recent turn of economic history.   
 
31  Lucas, R. E.: Macroeconomic Priorities, in: American Economic Review, 93/1 (2003), 1–14, here 1. 
32  Sargent, T./Wallace, N.: Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy, in: Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 2/2 (1976), 169–183. 
